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From Farm to Fork: Food Chain Security and Terrorism
02 Oct 2011Unintentional contamination of the food chain due to negligence, such as the fatal E.Coli outbreak in Germany in June 2011, can cause mass fatalities, severe disruption to food supplies and economies internationally, as well as wide spread panic. But deliberate contamination of the food chain, an international production and supply system, by terrorists could be catastrophic. So what measures are in place to protect the food supply chain from terrorist attacks?
The Threat
The only alleged ‘terrorist’ attacks against the food chain occurred in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. In the late 1970s, there were reported alleged incidents of Israeli citrus fruit on sale in Europe having been poisoned with liquid mercury injections. A letter from a supposed Palestinian group calling itself the Arab Revolutionary Army (ARA) was posted from Germany to various European health departments, claiming responsibility and saying they wanted to damage the Israeli economy. However, although a small number of cases of poisoning, none of which were fatal, were confirmed, many turned out to be hoaxes or a panic-stricken public reporting symptoms of poisoning that were in reality either psychosomatic or attributable to other causes. Leading Palestinian groups claimed no connection to the poisonings and furthermore claimed no knowledge of the ARA. The Palestine Liberation Organisation said that the poisonings were an attempt to discredit them and that they would never sully their cause by poisoning innocent people. Investigations by European and Israeli security services failed to identify the group or the culprits. The facts surrounding these incidents remain sparsely documented and unclear to this day. The most likely theory espoused by investigators is that radical German groups (of which there were several during the 1970s) had been behind the threats and small number of actual poisonings, in a misguided show of support for the Palestinians. One thing is certain; Israel’s citrus exports were severely affected during this period. There was a further hoax involving poisoned Israeli citrus fruit in Italy in 1988, which further harmed Israeli citrus exports.
A study by Israel’s Institute of Counter Terrorism (ICT) published in 2002, asked former Palestinian militants for their views on the use of bioterrorism. All of those interviewed stated that such a tactic would either amount to national suicide, with the consequences of Israel’s full military and political wrath, or to significant loss of international public support. Many of the militants stated that they simply did not need to engage in such unconventional warfare.
Following the 11th September 2001 attacks, the World Health Organisation (WHO) published a report on the terrorist threat to food. The report stated:
“Threats from terrorists, criminals and other anti-social groups who target the safety of the food supply are already a reality. During the past two decades, WHO Member States have expressed concern about the possibility that chemical and biological agents and radio-nuclear materials might deliberately be used to harm civilian populations. In recent months, the health ministries of several countries have increased their state of alert for intentional malevolent use of agents that may be spread through air, water or food.”
Countermeasures
SecuFood – Security of European Food Supply Chain – was a 12 month study conducted under the auspices of the Biomedical University of Rome and the University of Navarra and co-funded by the European Commission, between 2009-2010. The aim of the study was to discover what strategies were in place in sample EU member states to prevent criminal and terrorist attacks against the food chain. The project found that there are currently no specific EU directives or initiatives for the prevention of such attacks, even if there were at member state level. SecuFood investigated data relating to 450 malicious incidents worldwide from 1950 to 2008. The results found no evidence of any terrorist attack against the food supply chain (with the exception of the Israeli citrus fruit contamination) but that the number of malicious (criminal or disgruntled individuals) incidents had increased over recent years. SecuFood found the most effective countermeasures were video surveillance, area control and traceability.
In the United States, following 11th September 2001, the food and drinks industry was encouraged by the government to adopt heightened measures to protect food supplies from terrorist contamination. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced in April 2004 that it would support a research programme to help develop methods of protecting US food supplies. The National Centre for Food Protection and Defence (NCFPD) was launched as a Homeland Security Centre of Excellence at the University of Minnesota in July 2004, and over a three year period received $33 million in research funding from the DHS, with a further $20 million over six years announced in February 2010. The mission of the Centre is to find cost-effective ways to secure the US food chain from malicious contamination, and draws together expertise from universities, research facilities, private consultancies and large branded food and drinks companies. Some initiatives to improve security identified include ensuring the physical security of processes, certification of trade partners and carriers and the application of technology, such as Global Positioning Systems (GPS), to track the movement and location of food consignments. In 2010, the Centre hosted representatives from Thailand and Peru, in an effort to build the capacity of other countries to prevent the deliberate contamination of the food chain. One challenge the NCFPD is currently working on is how to distinguish between intentional and unintentional food-borne illness outbreaks.
In July 2005, the US Agriculture Department issued new voluntary guidelines for meatpackers, shippers and retailers. Companies were asked to check for vulnerabilities in the transportation process where terrorists could potentially contaminate food. The Department also issued a range of procedural guidelines outlining new duties for drivers and including requirements for processors to verify the security programmes of shipping companies.
In 2003, the Australian government formed the Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN), as part of the country’s Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy. Part of the TISN is the Food and Grocery Sector Group. The Group developed the National Food Chain Security Strategy to address vulnerabilities that could lead to deliberate contamination. The strategy recognises that the food supply chain is potentially vulnerable and acknowledges that it is neither possible nor economically feasible to attempt to deal with every risk. However, it states that there is a need to be ever mindful of new and emerging risks and it recognises the need to encourage an awareness of these risks and the need to sustain a culture of security awareness across all sectors of the industry.
In June this year, the UK media reported that the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) had warned food manufacturers and retailers that their industry was vulnerable to attacks by terrorists and extremists intent on causing casualties and disruption by poisoning the food chain. The CPNI has asked the food production and retail industry to increase security at depots and plants and to check for vulnerabilities in the supply chain. Food has been deliberately contaminated before, from criminals in extortion attempts and from individuals with a particular issue with a company or government, but, as the CPNI has said, these incidents have been rare. The most recent threat to hit the UK came from Brian Roach, a South African farmer who in 2010 / early 2011 threatened to unleash foot-and-mouth disease on the UK’s farming industry, claiming he add the expertise to do so. Roach blamed the UK for the plight of neighbouring white Zimbabwean farmers under Robert Mugabe. South African police worked with UK and US counter-terrorism teams to monitor his activities and arrest him. Roach was jailed for five years in June. An ‘agroterrorist’ (agricultural terrorism) attack such as a deliberate foot-and-mouth infection of livestock could cost the farming industry billions of pounds or dollars. The UK’s 2001 epidemic cost an estimated £8 billion.
The CPNI report warns that terrorists could contaminate prepared food or drink with chemicals, radioactive material or bacteria, such as E.Coli, or could target ingredients used in many food products, thus causing wide contamination. The report also stated that the security of imported produce was harder to guarantee than that of home-grown. Farms were highlighted as being at particular risk, as many employ foreign workers, and adequate references may not be followed-up for such individuals. The CPNI recommends businesses undertake comprehensive checks on new employees and visiting contractors. It also states that plants and depots should have security controls and that no unscheduled deliveries should be accepted.
The Food Industry Security Assurance Scheme (FISAS), developed by UK food certification company, the PAI Group, provides a model for the industry to adopt measures to protect their operations from acts of deliberate contamination. Companies certified to the FIFAS standard have to demonstrate they have rigorous security controls in place at each stage of their operations, with an annual assessment to ensure the standards continue to be met. The model incorporates both management controls and risk assessment. The security risk assessment should include physical security, company personnel, incoming materials and internal processes.
Conclusion
Securing the food chain is a complex task, but fortunately there have been few cases of bioterrorism against it, and no specific, credible threats in recent years despite the heightened overall terrorist threat. Many countries have, however, issued guidelines and recommendations to the food industry on how to prevent deliberate wide-scale contamination at all levels of the food production process. Common recommendations are increased physical security and surveillance, access control, certification of plants, shippers and warehouses, and background checks on employees.