And that is what appears to have happened in France recently, where although Mohamed Merah had, according to the French government, been under surveillance for some time France’s domestic intelligence service  for links to extremist Islam, he had been deemed not to be a significant threat.  But tragically that is exactly what he was.   Over a 10 day period, he killed three French soldiers of, like him, North African origin, and three children and an adult at a Jewish school, ostensibly to avenge the deaths of Palestinian children and for France’s involvement in the war in Afghanistan.  Ostensibly being the key word.

Because, from what has been published about Merah in the media, it is difficult to understand what he believed in, what really motivated him to do anything in his short life.  He was a violent petty criminal, he attempted suicide in prison, he liked to go to nightclubs and on skiing holidays with friends, he was calm and gentle according to those who knew him, he was out of control according to his mother, he tried to join the army – the one he would later go on to attack, and the French Foreign Legion, he travelled to Afghanistan and Pakistan and wanted to be an al-Qaeda jihadi…  He was an enigma.  But some of the greatest threats to society are enigmas – unknown lone wolves who remain a mystery even after their capture or death.  Merah claimed he was an al-Qaeda operative, but there is no evidence he was actually part of the network, or one of its affiliates or cells and the group hasn’t made a statement claiming him or his attacks as their own.   More likely it seems that he was an al-Qaeda wannabe, or indeed a wannabe for anything that would give him a sense of belonging and importance that he was missing, be it the army, Foreign Legion or a terrorist group, all of which appear to have rejected him.  Maybe he really was a rebel without a cause.

Even if he was just a psychologically troubled angry young man, and not a hard core extremist who was a known threat to security, he has still managed to perpetrate one of France’s worst acts of terrorism in recent years.  His greatest achievement appears to be France’s current purge of Islamist extremists in the country, as the government deports tens of resident foreign extremists to their countries of origin.   But when a state sees what is under its nose, but consigns that problem to distant lands, the threat does not stop.  It’s a vicious circle, and one that can only be broken by looking at the whole picture, at home and abroad and making sure that those classed as not posing a threat, really don’t.

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The Beginning

The terrorist attack on the USS Cole in the Port of Aden in October 2000, identified the need for increased security support for in-transit DoD personnel and assets in overseas locations with no permanent DoD security presence This led to the overall FPD programme being initiated. The primary mission of the FPD is to detect and warn of threats to in-transit DoD personnel and resources, as well as to act as a “force protection, force multiplier” for the American Embassy Country Team in each designated overseas location. This includes working closely with Host Nation security forces for threat warning and security. Other missions include providing routine DoD counterintelligence (CI) and force protection services to the Country Team and criminal and counterterrorism (CT) investigative responses.  There are currently 39 FPD offices worldwide.

FPD Indonesia

FPD Indonesia began full operations in 2009.  A component of the NCIS Singapore Field Office, it is staffed by an NCIS Resident Agent in Charge, a U.S. Army (USA) Special Agent and an Office Management Assistant.  In close coordination with the American Embassy Regional Security Office (RSO), Defence Attaché Office (DAO) and Office of Defence Cooperation (ODC), the FPD is the Embassy’s authority for developing, coordinating and overseeing force protection information and security for more than 200 events per year. These efforts not only support U.S. interests, but also significantly increase the overall security of both the Indonesian and international communities. Through close cooperation with and assistance from the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI)) and the Indonesian National Police (INP), FPD Indonesia activities focus on threat awareness and mitigation, physical security, risk assessments and vulnerability studies, emergency preparedness, crisis action planning and response, executive protection and investigations. The FPD is augmented by NCIS, U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), USA and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) force protection-focused personnel and teams as individual service component requirements arise.

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International and Regional Cooperation and Coordination

In 2005, the US initiated the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP).  This is a multi-year government programme aimed at defeating terrorism by strengthening regional counterterrorism capabilities, enhancing and institutionalising cooperation among the region’s security forces, promoting democratic governance, reinforcing bilateral military ties with the US and discrediting terrorist ideology. This involves establishing counterterrorism programmes to create a new regional focus, including the use of organisations such as the African Union and its Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism, in Algiers. These programmes include training to improve aviation and border security. The overall goals are to increase the capacities of governments in the Pan-Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal) to confront terrorist groups in the region. TSCTP also facilitates cooperation between the Pan-Sahel states and those in the Maghreb – Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia – in fighting the terrorist threat. TSCTP is backed up by military support from US Africa Command (AFRICOM) Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara (OEF-TS). OEF-TS partnership comprises the US and Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia.  TSCTP is an extension of the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), which completed in 2004.  The goals of PSI were to assist in the fight against global terrorism and to enhance regional security. Under TSCTP, US special operations forces train their counterparts in the participating countries in military tactics critical in enhancing regional security and stability.

In November 2009, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson gave testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations’ hearing on counterterrorism in the Sahel region. Carson stated that key countries in the area including Algeria, Mali and Mauritania have intensified efforts to coordinate their activities against al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and that the US had consulted with African and European partners to identify areas where the US could more effectively support regional security efforts.  Carson cautioned against the US taking actions that could increase local tensions or lend gravitas to AQIM’s claims of legitimacy.  He went on to state that the countries in the region have stated that the Sahel’s security is their own responsibility, and had not asked the US to take on a leadership role, citing that this could be counter-productive. Carson pledged the US’ ongoing support for regional security efforts.  Under the Obama administration, the US has cooperated more closely with Africa on security issues and on establishing good governance and respect for human rights.  Carson stated that progress in these areas is essential to the success of the struggle against groups such as AQIM, who take advantage of political and economic vulnerabilities.

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The event 

The London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games will take place from the end of July until the middle of September, over a 64 day period in 1000 venues (including the associated cultural event venues).  More than 10 million tickets have been sold for the events.

Sources of threat

Terrorism, serious and organised crime, petty crime and public order offences.  The terrorist threat includes Islamist Extremism, such as al-Qaeda and affiliated groups and individuals, and dissident Irish Republican militants.  The Olympic Games are seen by terrorists as one of the most high profile targets, due to the international high profile of the event, the number of countries, athletes, visitors and dignitaries involved and the nature of the event itself, to celebrate world unity through sport. The Games have been attacked in the past.  In 1972 Palestinian terrorist group Black September took members of the Israeli Olympic team hostage after breaking into their accommodation in the Olympic Village.  11 Israeli athletes and a German police officer were killed.   In 1996, right wing extremist Eric Robert Rudolph bombed the Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta, Georgia, US, after smuggling in pipe and nail bombs into the venue.

Security and Counter-terrorist measures

The Home Secretary has overall responsibility for the security of the Games.  The Home Office will work with the police service, Olympic Delivery Authority and the London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games (LOGOC) in order to ensure a safe and secure event.  LOGOC are the event organisers, responsible for staging the events.  Their role includes the safety and security of the venues.  Private security guards working for LOGOC will manage search and entry to the venues. At venues including the Olympic Park there will be bag searches, X-ray screening machines, metal detectors and CCTV.  The police at venues will be backed up by security guards, stewards, volunteers and the emergency services.  The Olympic Delivery Authority, responsible for building the venues and the Olympic Route Network, were responsible for ensuring security at the venues during their construction phase.  The International Olympic Committee has been meeting police and security officials during their regular assessments.

Security plans reflect the latest intelligence reports and risk assessments and plans are based on the current threat level to the UK from terrorism. Plans for the security operation begun when London won the bid to host the 2012 Olympics, in July 2005 (ironically one day before the 7th July London bombings).  Around 300 MI5 (the UK Security Service) officers are concentrating purely on protecting the Games.

The overall security force for the Games will consist of 23,700 personnel.

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The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) rebranded itself as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in 2007, after pledging allegiance to al-Qaeda.  Al-Qaeda, then deputy, leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, welcomed the GSPC into the wider al-Qaeda movement.  The GSPC, an extremist splinter group of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), was formed in Algeria in 1996, with the goal of overthrowing the secular Algerian government and imposing an Islamic state on the country.   AQIM has pledged to attack Algerian, US, French and Spanish targets. Algerian officials and authorities from neighbouring countries have speculated that the GSPC may be active outside Algeria. These activities may relate to the group’s alleged long-standing involvement with protection rackets, smuggling and money laundering across the borders of Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.

Leader

Abu Musab Abdul Wadoud, born in 1970, became leader of the then GSPC in 2004, upon the death of Nabil Sahraoui. In 2005, deputy GSPC leader Amari Saifi was sentenced to life in prison by an Algiers court for kidnapping 32 European tourists in 2003. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, is a deputy leader who leads the Saharan faction of the group and has organised the importation of arms for the underground network from Niger and Mali.

Combatants, Tactics and Financing

Estimated members range from 300-800.  AQIM’s tactics include bomb attacks and kidnappings.  About a dozen French and Italian hostages are currently being held by the group. Sources of finance are AQIM members living in Western Europe and Algerian expatriates sympathetic to the group, as well as protection rackets and smuggling across the Sahara and the Sahel.  The Algerian government has accused Sudan and Iran of financing the group.  AQIM has been designated as a terrorist organisation by the US and the EU as well as the governments of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.

Notable Attacks attributed to or claimed by AQIM and recent events

February 2003: 32 European tourists were kidnapped. One died, seventeen hostages were rescued by Algerian troops in May 2003, with the others were released in August 2003.

April 2007: At least 30 people were killed in bomb attacks against government buildings in Algiers.

September 2007: A suicide bomb attack against the motorcade of Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika killed 20 people.  The President was uninjured.

December 2007: Twin car bombs claimed by AQIM killed at least 37 people in Algiers, including 17 UN staff.

January 2008: the annual Dakar Rally was cancelled due to threats made by the group.

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Israel 18 August:  Militants opened fire on a bus, fired a missile at a private vehicle and detonated a bomb next to an army patrol, near the Egyptian border.  Eight Israelis, five Egyptians  and 10 of the estimated 12 militants were killed.  The attack led to increased attacks between Israel and Hamas in the following days, in which there were further killings.

Turkey 29 August: A small bomb exploded at a beach in Antalya, slightly injuring six people.

Israel 29 August: A Palestinian man wounded seven Israelis near a Tel Aviv nightclub, after ramming a car into a checkpoint and stabbing five people.

Yemen 3 September: Three policemen were killed by a suicide car bomber in the port city of Aden.

Asia

Pakistan 31 August: At least 11 people were killed and 20 injured as they celebrated Eid, by a a car bomb outside a mosque in Quetta.

India 7 September: A bomb outside the Indian High Court in the capital Delhi killed at least 10 people and wounded more than 60.  Harkat-ul Jihad al-Islami (Huji), an Islamist extremist group, claimed responsibility.

Pakistan 7 September: Suicide bombers attacked the residence of a military official in Quetta, killing 20 people.  The Taliban claimed responsibility.

Americas

United States 6 September: Three National Guardsmen were killed and several injured after a man walked into a pancake restaurant in Nevada and shot them with an AK-47 assault rifle.

Africa

Somalia 1 September: Seven people were injured after a grenade attack on a tea shop in the southern town of Luq.

Europe

United Kingdom 22 August:  A bomb was left at a bank in Newry, Northern Ireland, and made safe by army bomb disposal experts.  Dissident Republicans have been blamed.

The horrific attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York, and those in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, naturally led to a major change in the requirements demanded of security technology in combating and dealing with terrorist threats. Before that time, the focus of the industry was on generating alarms quickly and efficiently whenever any incident occurred. The aftermath brought about a demand for smart solutions, driven by the desire to prevent attacks but also the need to deal with any event as effectively as possible should it occur.

Conventional security systems still generally comprise of electric fences, barriers and checkpoints, surveillance systems, command centres and video recorders – for the evaluation of events after they have occurred. Some security solutions, however, now combine video with incident and emergency management with the aim of optimising security by way of an integrated command, control, decision-support and communication platform. These systems are not only able to monitor a site, manage the call-taking of responding security personnel and dispatch and administer resources on a daily basis but also, more importantly, able to do all of this in the heat of an emergency situation.

Getting the balance right

However, as terrorist tactics escalate and we find ourselves dealing with perpetrators willing to kill and die for their cause, it is evident that we need to be proactive in developing new technologies. Wherever it is possible, we need to anticipate likely new threats so that the means for dealing with them are developed in a timely manner. Achieving the balance of enhancing security procedures sufficiently to protect people and property, while safeguarding the right to privacy and individual freedom, is also a major challenge. A really effective defence is more a matter for our counter-terrorist intelligence agencies rather than just for the security technology industry.

Current technology can only make a difference in very specific scenarios without encroaching too far into the everyday civil liberties that we all take for granted. Terrorists might detonate an explosive device outside the secure area of an airport, train station or anywhere there are significant numbers of people. Yet, if continuous monitoring of the external environs of these facilities was to be effectively implemented, normal life would be completely disrupted. Similarly, if we recognise that the German rail system carries more passengers in a day than Lufthansa does in a year, we also have to appreciate that you cannot simply adopt the measures of an airport security checkpoint and apply it to the rail network. Developments in technology will undoubtedly have a role to play here – more sophisticated explosives detectors, improved metal detection and monitoring behavioural patterns are all amongst them. Individually they can help, but working together they can significantly increase the probability of success.

Technology to support the human element of security

In the development of today’s intelligent security technology, the United Kingdom is playing a leading role. There are, within the City of London for instance, an estimated 800,000 video cameras monitoring the streets around the clock. This is the greatest number of police security cameras per square metre of any city in the world. Though not all of these cameras are “intelligent”, the installed base that they all constitute has the potential to be developed into a networked system providing situational awareness of the whole city. In the United States a great deal of investment has also gone into intelligent security. But it is Israel which is leading the way in research spending, particularly into video analytics, the practice of using computers to detect, analyse, track and classify the activity of people and vehicles as they move through a site. Video analytics already commonly deployed includes perimeter violation, automatic number plate recognition and the monitoring of human movement and behaviour.

One reason current security measures are sometimes ineffective is the overall cost – particularly in terms of the man-hours involved with conventional video surveillance, where no intelligence is built into the technology. After only ten minutes of watching traditional CCTV images on six to ten screens for instance, the concentration of the average security guard is already dropping. After a total of only thirty minutes, attention will have fallen much further. Operators then need a lengthy break before they can resume monitoring activities with their original focus. With a system like that covering London, where there are 800,000 cameras, 8,000 teams each comprising six people (two people per 8-hour shift) would be required to cover twenty four hours efficiently – that’s 48,000 operators!

It is obvious that, to ensure effective ‘round-the-clock’ surveillance of images, solutions are needed to improve the way that video images are analysed. This is where the video analytics referred to earlier can assist. Over wide or diverse sites, surveillance systems that process various notifications make more sense than one that simply triggers an alarm when a barrier is breached. Modern-day, ‘intelligent’ surveillance systems can monitor numerous independent parameters, placing them within an overall context in order to create an overview of situational awareness. Human intervention is still required to determine whether an alarm should be triggered but it can be based on a much more thorough appreciation of the situation.

Surveillance technology featuring intelligent video analytics operating over a wide area is available for the continuous and reliable protection of critical infrastructure, using intelligent policy zones and virtual barriers. It combines camera and other sensor input and displays the entire protected site on one screen. It can detect, track, and classify activity in real time, enabling the operator to see exactly what is happening throughout the site as it occurs. By detecting or even anticipating incidents, it increases proactive security. Open architecture enables it to run on standard hardware and software, plus it can be modified to meet changing needs. It easily accommodates site-specific conditions and varying security levels in accordance with threat levels or evolving government mandates.

Online vulnerability

The threat to power supplies and other vital control systems is one that worries many security experts. One of their greatest fears is that technology will be compromised via internet hacking’ as many institutions have little or no encryption technology in place. This has led to a call for power supply systems to be disconnected from the internet in order to eradicate the risk. However, the main problem seems to be, not that the firewalls defending our power plants are unable to offer adequate protection, but rather that many operators fail to make full and effective use of the software and systems that they already have at their disposal. Even today, there are many instances where computer systems are compromised, not by remote hacking, but by files unwittingly introduced to the system by the operators themselves on memory sticks, for example. There is a need therefore to create a more appropriate mindset and the real will to establish a culture in which operators take the security threat seriously and treat the systems on which they work with the utmost care.

Integration to a single platform is key

But, above all, integration is key to facing the challenges to security posed by terrorists. The centralised management of multiple disciplines such as video surveillance, perimeter protection, intruder detection and access control, along with building technology systems (fire detection and alarm systems and emergency call systems), as well as communication systems, has long been possible. The consolidation of these sub-systems into one platform provides security managers with real situational awareness, streamlined operations, faster dispatch co-ordination, whilst greatly improving efficiency and reducing risk and cost. The move to open standards for networked, physical security products worldwide is already bringing about greater inter-operability between security products, systems and disciplines. The integration and flexibility brought about by these open standards should also help overcome the legacy issues of systems. It will soon be normal practice to enhance existing security systems with technological upgrades as they emerge, without the need to completely replace system hardware at great expense each time.

Ongoing research

However, ultimately we have to accept that the threat to our open and ‘free’ way of life will never be completely eliminated. It is part of the remit of the security industry to continue in its task of responding to threats and anticipating possible future scenarios. This requires a mix of research and development as well as the means to ensure that new technologies are actually delivered and implemented. The activities of universities are hugely important precursors to commercial research, with many of academia’s projects typically resulting in new mathematical methodologies or models. It is then the job of industry to take those concepts and use them in the development of successful new and cost-effective security solutions to assist in the ongoing fight against terrorism.

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The Threat

The only alleged ‘terrorist’ attacks against the food chain occurred in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. In the late 1970s, there were reported alleged incidents of Israeli citrus fruit on sale in Europe having been poisoned with liquid mercury injections.  A letter from a supposed Palestinian group calling itself the Arab Revolutionary Army (ARA) was posted from Germany to various European health departments, claiming responsibility and saying they wanted to damage the Israeli economy. However, although a small number of cases of poisoning, none of which were fatal, were confirmed, many turned out to be hoaxes or a panic-stricken public reporting symptoms of poisoning that were in reality either psychosomatic or attributable to other causes.  Leading Palestinian groups claimed no connection to the poisonings and furthermore claimed no knowledge of the ARA.  The Palestine Liberation Organisation said that the poisonings were an attempt to discredit them and that they would never sully their cause by poisoning innocent people. Investigations by European and Israeli security services failed to identify the group or the culprits.  The facts surrounding these incidents remain sparsely documented and unclear to this day.  The most likely theory espoused by investigators is that radical German groups (of which there were several during the 1970s) had been behind the threats and small number of actual poisonings, in a misguided show of support for the Palestinians.  One thing is certain; Israel’s citrus exports were severely affected during this period. There was a further hoax involving poisoned Israeli citrus fruit in Italy in 1988, which further harmed Israeli citrus exports.

A study by Israel’s Institute of Counter Terrorism (ICT) published in 2002, asked former Palestinian militants for their views on the use of bioterrorism.  All of those interviewed stated that such a tactic would either amount to national suicide, with the consequences of Israel’s full military and political wrath, or to significant loss of international public support.  Many of the militants stated that they simply did not need to engage in such unconventional warfare.

Following the 11^th September 2001 attacks, the World Health Organisation (WHO) published a report on the terrorist threat to food.  The report stated:

“Threats from terrorists, criminals and other anti-social groups who target the safety of the food supply are already a reality. During the past two decades, WHO Member States have expressed concern about the possibility that chemical and biological agents and radio-nuclear materials might deliberately be used to harm civilian populations. In recent months, the health ministries of several countries have increased their state of alert for intentional malevolent use of agents that may be spread through air, water or food.”

Countermeasures

SecuFood – Security of European Food Supply Chain – was a 12 month study conducted under the auspices of the Biomedical University of Rome and the University of Navarra and co-funded by the European Commission, between 2009-2010.  The aim of the study was to discover what strategies were in place in sample EU member states to prevent criminal and terrorist attacks against the food chain.  The project found that there are currently no specific EU directives or initiatives for the prevention of such attacks, even if there were at member state level.  SecuFood investigated data relating to 450 malicious incidents worldwide from 1950 to 2008. The results found no evidence of any terrorist attack against the food supply chain (with the exception of the Israeli citrus fruit contamination) but that the number of malicious (criminal or disgruntled individuals) incidents had increased over recent years. SecuFood found the most effective countermeasures were video surveillance, area control and traceability.

In the United States, following 11^th September 2001, the food and drinks industry was encouraged by the government to adopt heightened measures to protect food supplies from terrorist contamination.  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced in April 2004 that it would support a research programme to help develop methods of protecting US food supplies.  The National Centre for Food Protection and Defence (NCFPD) was launched as a Homeland Security Centre of Excellence at the University of Minnesota in July 2004, and over a three year period received $33 million in research funding from the DHS, with a further $20 million over six years announced in February 2010.  The mission of the Centre is to find cost-effective ways to secure the US food chain from malicious contamination, and draws together expertise from universities, research facilities, private consultancies and large branded food and drinks companies.  Some initiatives to improve security identified include ensuring the physical security of processes, certification of trade partners and carriers and the application of technology, such as Global Positioning Systems (GPS), to track the movement and location of food consignments.  In 2010, the Centre hosted representatives from Thailand and Peru, in an effort to build the capacity of other countries to prevent the deliberate contamination of the food chain. One challenge the NCFPD is currently working on is how to distinguish between intentional and unintentional food-borne illness outbreaks.

In July 2005, the US Agriculture Department issued new voluntary guidelines for meatpackers, shippers and retailers.  Companies were asked to check for vulnerabilities in the transportation process where terrorists could potentially contaminate food.  The Department also issued a range of procedural guidelines outlining new duties for drivers and including requirements for processors to verify the security programmes of shipping companies.

In 2003, the Australian government formed the Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN), as part of the country’s Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy.  Part of the TISN is the Food and Grocery Sector Group.  The Group developed the National Food Chain Security Strategy to address vulnerabilities that could lead to deliberate contamination.  The strategy recognises that the food supply chain is potentially vulnerable and acknowledges that it is neither possible nor economically feasible to attempt to deal with every risk. However, it states that there is a need to be ever mindful of new and emerging risks and it recognises the need to encourage an awareness of these risks and the need to sustain a culture of security awareness across all sectors of the industry.

In June this year, the UK media reported that the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) had warned food manufacturers and retailers that their industry was vulnerable to attacks by terrorists and extremists intent on causing casualties and disruption by poisoning the food chain.  The CPNI has asked the food production and retail industry to increase security at depots and plants and to check for vulnerabilities in the supply chain. Food has been deliberately contaminated before, from criminals in extortion attempts and from individuals with a particular issue with a company or government, but, as the CPNI has said, these incidents have been rare.  The most recent threat to hit the UK came from Brian Roach, a South African farmer who in 2010 / early 2011 threatened to unleash foot-and-mouth disease on the UK’s farming industry, claiming he add the expertise to do so. Roach blamed the UK for the plight of neighbouring white Zimbabwean farmers under Robert Mugabe.  South African police worked with UK and US counter-terrorism teams to monitor his activities and arrest him.  Roach was jailed for five years in June. An ‘agroterrorist’ (agricultural terrorism) attack such as a deliberate foot-and-mouth infection of livestock could cost the farming industry billions of pounds or dollars.  The UK’s 2001 epidemic cost an estimated £8 billion.

The CPNI report warns that terrorists could contaminate prepared food or drink with chemicals, radioactive material or bacteria, such as E.Coli, or could target ingredients used in many food products, thus causing wide contamination. The report also stated that the security of imported produce was harder to guarantee than that of home-grown.    Farms were highlighted as being at particular risk, as many employ foreign workers, and adequate references may not be followed-up for such individuals.  The CPNI recommends businesses undertake comprehensive checks on new employees and visiting contractors.  It also states that plants and depots should have security controls and that no unscheduled deliveries should be accepted.

The Food Industry Security Assurance Scheme (FISAS), developed by UK food certification company, the PAI Group, provides a model for the industry to adopt measures to protect their operations from acts of deliberate contamination.  Companies certified to the FIFAS standard have to demonstrate they have rigorous security controls in place at each stage of their operations, with an annual assessment to ensure the standards continue to be met. The model incorporates both management controls and risk assessment. The security risk assessment should include physical security, company personnel, incoming materials and internal processes.

Conclusion

Securing the food chain is a complex task, but fortunately there have been few cases of bioterrorism against it, and no specific, credible threats in recent years despite the heightened overall terrorist threat.  Many countries have, however, issued guidelines and recommendations to the food industry on how to prevent deliberate wide-scale contamination at all levels of the food production process.  Common recommendations are increased physical security and surveillance, access control, certification of plants, shippers and warehouses, and background checks on employees.

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The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA – or just IRA) was established in 1969 after many members of the original Irish Republican Army (IRA) opposed its position on recognising the jurisdiction and authority of parliaments in London, Belfast and Dublin. The original IRA had been fighting for a united Ireland, free from British administration in the province of Ulster (Northern Ireland) and called a ceasefire in 1972 after the British Government suspended the Northern Ireland Parliament and introduced direct rule.  PIRA’s terrorist campaigns during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s affected Northern Ireland, Great Britain and mainland Europe. Dissident Irish Republicans opposed to the Northern Ireland peace process which largely followed from the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, or Belfast Agreement as it is officially called, have reared their head in recent years as they continue to engage in direct military action.  The two main dissident groups, which developed after splits within PIRA, are the Real IRA (RIRA), established in 1997 and the Continuity IRA (CIRA), established in 1986. The term Oglaigh na hEireann (ONH – ‘soldiers of Ireland’) is a term that refers to all who are engaged in Irish nationalist militancy and is also used by these groups and by individual dissident republicans who are not aligned to a particular group. On 28 July 2005, PIRA declared a formal end to its armed campaign. The 32 County Sovereignty Movement (32CSM) is a political organisation that supports the use of physical force and is often referred to as the political wing of RIRA.  The Irish National Liberation Army, a former dissident group, declared a ceasefire in 1998 and formally ended its armed campaign in 2009.  The original IRA, PIRA, RIRA, CIRA, INLA and all other Republican dissident groups, remain proscribed terrorist organisations in the United Kingdom, and in several other countries.

Notable Incidents:

RIRA members carried out the Omagh bombing, which killed 29 people in August 1998, a rocket propelled grenade attack on the headquarters of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (‘MI6’) in London in September 2000 and more recently, in March 2009, they shot dead two soldiers as they collected a pizza delivery outside their barracks in Antrim, and seriously injured several other individuals caught up in the shooting, and also ambushed a policeman on patrol.  On 2 April 2011, 25-year-old Police Service of Northern Ireland constable Ronan Kerr was killed by a car bomb. The dissident republican unit believed to be responsible includes former PIRA members who are in allegiance with, but operate autonomously from, RIRA.  In May 2011, dissidents opposed to the historic state visit of Britain’s Elizabeth II to the Republic of Ireland were thought to be behind bomb threats to London, none of which turned out to be credible.

Threat level:

The report of the UK’s Independent Monitoring Commission in May 2010 concluded that dissident republicans remain highly active and dangerous.  In July 2010, the Belfast Telegraph reported that security services both sides of the Irish border believe that dissidents had obtained heavy weapons, including rockets and assault rifles, from illegal arms dealers in southeast Europe. Jonathan Evans, Director General of the UK’s Security Service (‘MI5’) said in September 2010 that recently there had been signs of co-ordination between the various dissident groups which had previously tended to form separate groups based on marginal distinctions and personal rivalries.  He said: “Whilst at present the dissidents’ campaign is focused in Northern Ireland we cannot exclude the possibility that they might seek to extend their attack to Great Britain as violent Republican groups have traditionally done.”  MI5 currently rates the threat from the dissidents as ‘substantial’, the third highest threat category. However, unlike at the height of ‘The Troubles’ throughout the 1960s, 70s, 80s and until the mid 1990s, the dissidents do not appear to have the support and sympathy of the majority of the Northern Ireland public, including Catholic nationalists, as many do not want to see the clock turned back to pre-1998 and the violence of The Troubles, and there was mass public revolt at the killing of Ronan Kerr.

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Police CT operations

Following the 11^th September 2001 attacks, the Cabinet approved police funding for a range of counter terrorist measures, in early 2002. New positions established to increase capability include: an Assistant Commissioner to take an executive lead on counter terrorism and national security matters, a Special Tactics Group to respond operationally to terrorist emergencies, a Specialist Search Group and National Bomb Data Centre Manager, a new Strategic Intelligence Unit (SIU), new liaison positions at diplomatic missions in London, Washington DC, Jakarta, Suva and Beijing (in addition to its existing liaisons in Canberra, Sydney and Bangkok) and additional police at six New Zealand airports. Police are responsible for coordinating requests to the Prime Minister for designating groups as a terrorist entity.

The main objective of the new Strategic Intelligence Unit (SIU) is to increase New Zealand’s capability and understanding of the domestic and international security environment. The unit provides strategic and tactical intelligence on terrorism. It also provides intelligence on complex national and transnational criminal activities that potentially impact the national security of New Zealand and other countries.

There is close interaction between the Police and intelligence agencies, such as the NZSIS, of which the police is a member of its Combined Threat Assessment Group, to ensure a co-ordinated approach to national security and counter terrorism.  Police are present at the country’s international airports and also work closely with agencies such as Customs and Immigration.

Other Police units involved in counter terrorism include: the Special Tactics Groups (STG)
which provides tactical capability, deals with armed incidents beyond the capability of the Armed Offender Squads, and provides protection to high risk individuals; Armed Offender Squads (AOS) which provides armed response to incidents involving actual and suspected firearms; Specialist Search Group (SSG)
which searches for Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and has been used in all major security operations including the 1990 Commonwealth Games;   Diplomatic Protection Squad (DPS) which provides personal protection for government guests, such as Heads of State and is also responsible for the protection of New Zealand dignitaries, both in New Zealand and overseas.

Operational Partners

In the event of a terrorist situation beyond the resources of the Police, they can request the government to deploy the New Zealand Defence Force to assist them, specifically the Special Air Service Group (NZSAS). In October 2009, specialist trainers from NZP, along with trainers from the US, Australia and Indonesia, provided CT training to a group of Vietnamese Ministry of Public Security personnel in Hanoi.  There are plans for providing further courses in Vietnam.  In May 2011, NZP hosted Exercise Ready Pasifika, a regional CT exercise, in Auckland, with 14 Pacific Island nations, which involved table top exercises.

Notable Events

In October 2007, NZP made a series of armed CT raids in response to the discovery of an alleged paramilitary training camp in the Urewera Mountains.  17 people were arrested and charged with firearms offences, although warrants had been issued for breaches of the Terrorism Suppression Act, but none of those detained were charged under this act.   The raids targeted Maori activists who, NZP alleged, were planning a militant campaign throughout New Zealand to establish an independent Tuhoe tribal state on traditional Tuhoe land. In September 2011 charges against 13 of the 17 were dropped due to inadmissible evidence. Four are still facing charges of participating in a criminal gang and unlawful possession of a firearm.  The raids were very controversial in New Zealand with many seeing the raids as suppression of activism and protest, not terrorism, and some political organisations and campaign groups called for the repeal of the Terrorism Suppression Act (2002).

New Zealand is currently hosting the 2011 Rugby World Cup (RWC).  The tournament has had no open terrorist threats made against it, unlike al-Qaeda threats against the more high profile FIFA World Cup football tournaments. Superintendent Grant O’Fee is NZP’s operations commander for the RWC and has multi-agency support that includes the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS), elite police squads and the Defence Force.   Security arrangements, including evacuation plans, crowd control and driving VIPs to and from the stadia, have been practised during rugby matches across New Zealand in the year leading up to the start of the RWC. Police will increase security for the USA’s opening match again Ireland, as it ironically takes place on 11^th September, the 10 year anniversary of 9/11.  New Zealand authorities have stated a terrorist attack against the RWC is unlikely, but they are preparing for any scenario, including the worst cases.

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